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Announce the Opening of Their Furniture Store
to the People of Tulsa and Surrounding Territory

Monday, October Ninth

An announcement that will mean much to those who have heretofore associated the word "Furniture" with high prices. To these people we wish to state right at the very outset that in this, the newest furniture store in Tulsa—"Our Store," they may choose from a new up-to-date stock—furniture of latest design, at prices no higher than furniture of equal quality, but old style, costs elsewhere.

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immediately recognize in our new and complete display of dependable furniture every desired characteristic—the best materials, superb cabinet work, etc. Beautiful furniture in ivory finish or rich looking mahogany, walnut or oak—the kind that is made to meet the requirements of the modern home makers.

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You will find on our floors a complete line of new period furniture, as well as the regulation styles in more common use. The more you know about furniture values, the more readily will you realize and wonder at our reasonable prices. It will pay you to see our exhibition of—

Correct House Furnishings

A New Piece of Furniture—

will doubtless be needed to enhance the coziness of the living room and help you get the most out of the long, delightful winter evenings, and now while our stocks are new and fresh is the time to let us assist you in putting your home in cheery winter dress.

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The joy, the charm of choosing your own furniture and carrying out the plans of months. Realities take the place of dreams, and the "castles-in-the-air" becomes a real home. "New home makers" will find our prices suited to even the most moderate salaries and incomes.

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carries a full line of Stoves, Refrigerators, Carpets, Rugs, etc., in addition to a full line of Furniture. It is a store for all the people, all the time. We will be as glad to show our wares as to sell them. The same pleasant, particular and painstaking attention will be given and the same interest taken whether an immediate or future purchase is contemplated. Our patrons must never cease to be glad they came to us first. What a customer has in mind is what we mean to show—to evade it would be to create ill will. The price one wishes to pay—no more—is the price we come as closely quoting as the intrinsic value of the article will permit.

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at Lower Prices Than You Have Been Accustomed to Paying

THE PYEATT-EARNS FURNITURE CO.

14-16 West Fourth St.

THE "WORLD" IS OPPOSITE OUR STORE

Phone 362

German Retreat in West Forced; Can't Retire in the East

Another Offensive Is Only Move Left

Whole Strategy at This Stage Proves Fronts Are Too
Extended for Tentative Armies to Hang on and Partial
Withdrawal From Russia Would Not Shorten Lines,
but Lengthen Them.

UP AGAINST A STIFF PROPOSITION NOW

Simultaneous Attacks of Allies Keep Hindenburg's In-
ferior Forces Busy and Prevent Him From Carrying
Out Great Onslaught. Foch and Brussiloff Have
Solved Problem of Captured French Trenches.

By JOHN L. HALLIDAY
(Copyright 1916, by McClure, Newhall & Co.)

LONDON, Sept. 24. Germany's new military masters, the fabled old Marshal Hindenburg and his brilliant co-commander, Ludendorff, now find themselves compelled by the inexorable laws of circumstances, which any student of war can read with as much certainty as the all-highest great command staff to do one of two things.

They must embark on a bold offensive designed to pulverize their enemies on one of the principal war fronts, or they must radically shorten their lines. The latter course, which military authorities in Europe believe inevitable because it constitutes the former alternative impracticable, will involve the evacuation of thousands of square miles of occupied territory.

So much is axiomatic. Without seeking to indulge in prophecy, I will set forth in this article the reasons which make it appear more than probable that the next great German move will be a retreat on the western front, the most considerable military event in that theater of war since the retreat from the Marne. Whether this retreat will take place before the coming winter or after the rains and the mud make great infantry actions impracticable may depend very largely on the extent and duration of the pressure which the French and British armies are able to exert upon the Somme lines.

The whole German theory of war is against such a retreat and in favor of a renewed offensive. It is incumbent, therefore, to explain briefly why

and at least ten of the divisions are bolstering up the Austrians or trying to stem the Russian advance in Transylvania by taking part in Mackensen's counter-attack. Obviously, without a great rearrangement of forces, an offensive directed against three times as many Russians fairly well outnumbered would be hopeless.

The public is familiar with the situation on the west front, where Germany has disposed 130,000 divisions, 25 of them engaged on the Somme, about 20 around Verdun, and the rest holding the greater part of the four hundred-mile front. An attack here could not be attempted with less than thirty divisions at the minimum, and where those troops are to come from so long as the French and British maintain their present pressure none of my informants can see. An offensive in the west by the Germans would lay their depleted lines open to a counter-attack stroke that might prove not only disastrous, but fatal, to them.

Having briefly outlined the reasons why a German offensive seems impossible, the factors that seemingly must compel the Germans to retreat before the next campaign opens will be outlined. Admitting that Hindenburg has not enough men to advance, it may be asked, why can he not simply stand put, since the attacks of the allies are costing them far more men and shells than the losses they inflict amount to?

In the first place, the present German trench lines are too widely extended to the number of troops available to hold them. This statement is substantiated by German critics themselves and holds true whatever may be the real facts about the second problem of the rate of German warfare and the number of men available who can be put into the trenches to fill gaps. Counting all the armistices of the western Russian, Rumanian and Balkan fronts, the German armies, with the help of from 75 to 80 Austro-Hungarian and 23 Bulgarian divisions, are holding 1,700 miles of battle line. There are less than 1,200,000 German soldiers—meaning the trenches and not 2,000,000 Austro-Hungarian and Balkan. The Turkish situation need not be considered in this connection, since for this year the Asiatic theater of war has only an indirect bearing on the European fronts. Less than 2,000 German soldiers are available for each mile of front, assisted by not many more than 1,000 Austrians and Bulgarians and, of course, in point of fact the concentrations of more than 1,000,000 men on a front of only a few miles on the Somme and at Verdun cuts this hypothetical figure down by more than one-third.

Thinness Now Felt. Until the allies by their simultaneous attacks wrested the initiative from the German staff, the thinness of the Teutonic lines in most parts of the front did not matter greatly, for they were able to keep their enemies more than busy defending themselves. Moreover, the munition supply of the Russians and British did not until this year permit concerted allied onslaughts upon a huge scale. Lack of teamwork between Russia, Britain and France made still easier the defensive task of Chief of Staff von Falkenhayn, who by his famous "shut-the-door-and-loom" system used in the network of the German railways to rush

troops from one front to the other either for attack or defense. The allied strategy at present, exemplified by the great operations simultaneously carried out in Picardy and Galicia, successfully prevents the transfer of troops in this way, and one of the most brilliant triumphs of German preparedness and organization can no longer be repeated.

The present German lines on neither front were chosen for the purpose of a prolonged defensive, but are the result of unsuccessful attempts to win decisive victories. Especially is this true in the east. The far-flung Teutonic hosts in Russia are standing where they are because they can go neither forward nor backward and reached their present positions during an almost successful attempt to round up and destroy the Russian field armies last autumn.

The entry of Rumania into the war came at a time when the tension caused by too widely extended lines must already have been severely felt. When the strength of the German army has already commenced to decline in actual numbers is perhaps not absolutely certain, although nearly every military authority on the allied side believes that it has. But that the German strength in man power and munition supply has been rapidly declining all this year on both fronts, relatively to the strength of the allies, admits of no doubt. And with the trench lines already so thinly manned that Russia was able to make a great dent in the southeastern sector, incidentally adding sixty miles to the length of the front, Rumania suddenly threw the German lines into the scale and opened operations on a 200-mile line.

The addition of a big army to the ranks of her foes was indeed serious for Germany, but not so menacing as the extension of the front caused by Rumania's entry into the war. Six hundred thousand troops on the old fronts of the allies would be a welcome reinforcement, but Colonel Repington, the British expert, believes the new mileage added to the Austro-German lines by Rumania's position makes her declaration of war at least twice as valuable as would have been the case had she only been able to send her army to France.

That this diagnosis is correct was shown by the tactics adopted immediately after Rumania came in. Regardless of the effect upon public opinion in Hungary, the fair-landed Transylvanians were abandoned without a blow by the Austrian armies, which retreated to the line of the Maros river in order to flatten out the Transylvanian salient and lessen by 150 miles the new front they are compelled to defend. Such a move would never have been made a year ago, nor would it be made now unless the problem of finding men to man the fronts had become most serious.

Lines Grow Longer. The second reason why a retirement must be made somewhere is found in the nature of the present allied offensives. Instead of the old-fashioned trench warfare, it has been proved that elaborately constructed trench lines miles in depth, fortified by all the barbed wire that can be tangled over the ground and fifty machine guns to a battalion, cannot prevent the allied artillery from blasting a way through for their infantry. As these attacks have

proceeded and the Germans have been driven back little by little in the west and tried with some success to stem the serious defeats of their Austrian friends in the east one of the principal aims of allied strategy at this stage of the war has been slowly realized. The Germans, their fronts already too widely extended for the number of men available to hold them, have beheld their lines grow shorter, but longer, as the Russian, French and British attacks gained ground. As wedges have been driven into the defensive lines and salients formed new trench systems had to be dug of greater length than the old ones which had been lost and more men found somewhere to man them. The effect of such a push as that of General Brussiloff south of the Pinsk marshes upon the all-important problem of length of front can easily be appreciated by a simple experiment. Draw a straight line to represent the Austro-German front before the attack. Then draw an irregular line, representing the trenches of the defenders today. The width between the points of the two lines, measured straight across, is the same as before, but the irregular line is much longer than the straight one. So it is on the Somme; whenever an advance is made not only do the Germans lose men killed, wounded and captured, but they must strip other fronts or find somewhere in the rear more men than they had before to man the additional trench mileage forced on them by their enemies' success.

All this, of course, has been theoretically obvious to all soldiers since the beginning of trench warfare. Its sudden and vital present importance is due, first, to the relative decline in German numbers, which throws them on the defensive everywhere, and, secondly, to the unexpected success of Generals Foch and Brussiloff in breaking through trench positions, which the Germans believed practically impregnable.

It is too soon to write an appreciation of the tactics of General Foch on the Somme, but already military men are saying that he has proved himself the first strategist in Europe for the second time. His blow against the Prussian guard was the battle of the Marne when all seemed lost; now his system of attack seems to some critics to have solved the problem of overcoming trench defenses. Instead of attacking the German trenches on a wide front, his troops on the Somme have perfected a "wedge system," gaining a footing here and there, then pushing laterally along the front, creating little pockets and bulges which can be cut off or combed out. This, however, is a digression, for the dates available for consideration of this problem, I mention Brussiloff and Foch because the success of their nibbling tactics may play a part in the German retirement entirely apart from the mere creation of salients which require more men for the Germans to man—may indeed impel the enemy to a retreat of greater proportions than has been thought likely as a precaution against a possible "break-through"—that allowing vision that haunts the slumbers of allied strategists—in the spring.

Can't Attempt Offensive. It has been shown that the Germans are probably not in a position to attempt an offensive and that if

they cannot break through the iron ring of enemies, they will be compelled to shorten their lines somewhere because their lines are too long for the number of men they have to hold them and because enemy attacks are constantly making the lines longer yet.

There remains for explanation the statement made at the beginning of this article—that the impending retreat will be carried out in France and not in the east. The objections, from the German point of view, to a retirement here are obvious and most weighty. France is the principal theater of war, where the greatest armies are massed. A retreat here will advertise to all the world, even to the German people, that all hope of victory from west is lost. The great industrial regions of France—the coal mines, perhaps even the iron ore fields, would be abandoned in a general retreat, robbing Germany of million-ton-making power and transferring it to France.

The reason why the retreat seems bound to come in France is so powerful that it will outweigh even those motives for standing put. It is that a practicable retreat on any other front will not shorten the German lines, but lengthen them.

The statement sounds paradoxical, but a glance at a map of the east front will show that it is true. The great stretch of swamp and marshland known as the Pinsk marshes, which is 120 miles across and separates both the Austro-German and Russian armies into two separate groups, is held with a few brigades which do most of their fighting from boats. It is quite impossible for either army. A German retreat to the fortress of Brest Litovsk in the center of the line would abandon the marshes and compel both sides to dig in along the whole front, as in the west, and the mileage saved by such a movement here would be less than the mileage added to the lines by the removal from the swamp.

A retirement of the northern German armies along from before Riga and Dwinsk back across Courland and Lithuania is not practicable unless the center of the line goes back too. Such a movement would present a most dangerous angle to the superior forces of General Ruzsky, who might take advantage of it to launch a great attack which would result in disaster for the Prussian armies in the center. And if to avoid this danger the central German armies fell back together with the northern group, the withdrawal from the marshes would add more mileage to the central front than would be gained by shortening the one to the north.

In the south, a retreat is still more impossible. It is sometimes carelessly assumed that the Austrians can again retire through Galicia to the San and the unpronounceable Przemyśl or even to Cracow, as they did in 1914 and again at the beginning of the following year. But at that time the German lines did not extend from the north down to the Kovel region, and were the armies in Galicia to retreat, another front would have to be formed facing south to cover the German armies to the north. At the same time, the Austrians would be compelled to keep armies in the Carpathian passes as they have them today, so the Russians could not break through to the Hungarian plain. Therefore the loss of Lemberg and a

protracted retreat would actually triple the mileage of the Austro-German front in the southeastern war theater. This perhaps explains the desperate and so far successful efforts of the Germans to save Lemberg, whose capture they formerly held with equanimity. The Russians indeed, if they pressed through Galicia, would find themselves with enemies before them and on both flanks in a most dangerous position were not their foes too weak to hold such an extended line. And the whole strategy of the present campaign shows that the Teutonic high command feels itself too weak to permit such an extension of front to take place if it can be avoided.

Retirement Not Practicable. A retirement in the east is not practicable, unless perhaps it were to extend right to the borders of Germany itself, an intolerable humiliation at this stage, and therefore since there must be a retirement somewhere the experts look for it in the west. There are no data at hand at this writing as to how far back the Germans will go when they do go. The line of the Scheldt, some guess; others think Hindenburg's appointment as chief of the general staff was intended to show that he was to make a drastic retirement to the line of the Meuse in prospect. If this is done, the Germans will retain only a narrow strip of France, their front running up the river through Verdun, Clermont, the fortress of Namur, Louvain or Brussels, Malines and Antwerp. Such a retreat would bring the German armies to a line two hundred miles shorter than that they now hold, and one much more capable of prolonged resistance. But most authorities prefer as yet not to carry their speculations further than to say that there will be a retirement before spring, and that it will be in the west.

The Limit. "We girls had hardships when we camped out—only one drinking glass among five girls."

"And only one mirror."

"Good night!"—Kansas City Journal.

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